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security decisions are made and then 
undone� gates puts it very well: “While 
the national security apparatus to deal 
with � � � problems is gigantic, ultimately 
they all had to be addressed by just eight 
people: the president, the vice president, 
the secretary of state, the secretary of 
defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of staff, the director of national intel-
ligence, the director of the CIa, and the 
national security advisor�” Duty is an 
interesting window into the thoughts 
and actions of one of those eight�
THoMas HoNe
Formerly of the Naval War College, the Naval 
Air Systems Command, and the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense
Porch, Douglas� Counterinsurgency: Exposing the 
Myths of the New Way of War� New York: Cam-
bridge Univ� Press, 2013� 434pp� $23�88
Douglas Porch, military historian and 
academic, currently a distinguished 
professor of national security affairs 
at the Naval Postgraduate school, has 
written a highly polemical and critical 
intellectual history of counterinsurgency, 
aka CoIN� It has been selected by the 
army chief of staff for his professional 
reading list, so it is a must-read, at least 
for army officers, and more generally 
for those who follow a debate in which 
sobriety and balance are rare virtues� 
according to Porch, CoIN’s intellectual 
roots lie in nineteenth-century impe-
rialism, which was often justified in 
paternalistic ways� even today, CoIN’s 
mission is to “civilize” indigenous societ-
ies by importing Western norms and 
practices that are often severely at odds 
with local custom or resented because 
they are imported at the muzzle of an 
M16� Whether one considers the French 
in vietnam and algeria or the British in 
south africa, Malaya, Palestine, Kenya, 
Ireland, and Northern Ireland (and 
elsewhere), the most common root of 
insurgency, according to Porch, is that 
other peoples do not wish to be ruled by 
foreigners� Population-centric opera-
tions (Porch does not call them strate-
gies) designed to win hearts and minds 
have frequently failed, because insur-
gency is less about grievance resolution 
for a “biddable population,” as CoIN 
proponents assume, than about ideology 
or political goals� War among the people 
thus often becomes war against the peo-
ple, for a variety of reasons, beginning 
with the fact that Western counterinsur-
gents often assume, with good reason, 
that “the people” are in cahoots with the 
insurgents, who otherwise would be un-
able to operate� Therefore, counterinsur-
gents seek to divide indigenous societies 
in the colonial manner so as better to 
control them, which only undermines 
the modern state building that CoIN 
advocates seek to achieve� Furthermore, 
a Western tradition that sees guerrillas 
and insurgents as terrorists and criminal 
assassins and not as lawful combat-
ants has often led to illegal detention, 
torture, denial of food, extrajudicial 
execution, disappearances, concentra-
tion camps, and other counterproduc-
tive efforts to isolate the people from 
insurgents, gain intelligence, and break 
the will of the insurgents� In this way, 
Porch argues that even in victory CoIN 
usually comes at a heavy moral price�
Porch also objects to CoIN proponents’ 
seeing themselves as technicians, apply-
ing the “lessons” derived from historical 
cases, especially Malaya� By focusing 
on grievance alleviation as their central 
concern, these military officers engage 
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in “armed social work,” usually creating 
more problems than they solve� often 
well-meaning reforms, like land reform, 
infrastructure improvement, power 
sharing, self-government, demands for 
less corruption, and so on, that form the 
staples of the CoIN approach end up 
foundering because of the resentment of 
a foreign military presence� Many create 
dependence relationships with host na-
tionals, undermine the sovereignty and 
legitimacy of local authorities, have neg-
ative economic impacts, or are wasteful� 
Porch considers one of the most danger-
ous problems with an “armed social 
work” approach to intervention to be the 
politicizing of officers, by taking them 
out of their military roles and giving 
them civic and political responsibilities, 
in a process referred to as “civil-military 
fusion�” CoIN proponents have often 
argued that the challenges of insurgency 
are so complex that military and politi-
cal authority have to be fused� officers, 
proconsuls really, have thus acquired 
forms of political power abroad that they 
would never be allowed at home� as they 
grew accustomed to wielding political 
power abroad, they sometimes grew 
contemptuous of political authorities at 
home, hijacking policy and thus damag-
ing civil-military relations� Counter-
insurgents in algeria in the 1950s, for 
example, came to think that the French 
republic was a liability to the empire� 
To save the empire and the military’s 
reputation, they believed, they had to 
overthrow the republic—arguably the  
worst possible kind of breakdown of 
civil-military relations and a complete 
inversion of the Clausewitzian ap-
proach, which subordinates strategy 
and those who make it to policy and 
political leaders� so the greatest danger 
is what Porch, directly following the 
philosopher Hannah arendt and indi-
rectly such thinkers as edmund Burke 
and Thucydides, calls the “boomerang 
effect,” or the “revenge of the periphery” 
—that coercive CoIN practices and 
methods worked out on distant battle-
fields often return home, in greater or 
lesser degrees, in the form of repressive 
measures inimical to free government�
This gets to the heart of Porch’s critique 
of CoIN on strategic grounds� First, he 
argues that CoIN is not a strategy but a 
collection of “lessons learned” and suc-
cessful minor tactics that appear to be 
transferable across theaters, years, and 
cultures� This is especially true if special 
operations come to be seen as synony-
mous with CoIN, so that it degenerates 
into a sort of decapitation strategy� sec-
ond, Porch holds, the case for making 
CoIN a branch of special operations is 
weak� It assumes that the special opera-
tors are more adaptable than conven-
tional forces, but Porch demonstrates 
that while adaptation is necessary in 
CoIN, conventional forces are no worse 
(and sometimes better) at adapting than 
the special operators� Third, there is a 
serious danger in adapting too much in 
the direction of CoIN� Had the United 
states gone whole hog on CoIN in 
vietnam, Porch suggests, it might have 
left itself even more unprepared than it 
was for Cold War conflict on the Central 
Front in germany� Fourth, losers do not 
always give the best advice, and much 
of CoIN theory is based on the pre-
scriptions of losers—like David galula, 
a veteran of the French war in alge-
ria, whose shadow looms large in the 
army CoIN doctrinal document, Field 
Manual (FM) 3-24� Porch shows that 
the French in algeria actually followed 
galula’s principles but ultimately lost� 
Why? some of those principles proved 
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counterproductive in practice� Isolat-
ing the people from insurgents sounds 
great in theory, but if it requires putting 
significant numbers of the people in 
concentration camps or driving them 
into exile, it is likely to produce more 
enemies than friends� Moreover, the 
strategic context, the international, 
social, institutional, and economic 
environment, was stacked against the 
French, as it was for them before and for 
the United states later in vietnam, and 
then again, some might say, in Iraq� In 
other words, CoIN is not a magic bullet� 
When policy makers blunder into wars 
involving unpredicted insurgencies with 
unexpected strength and resilience, to 
think that CoIN by itself can save them 
from the consequences of their policies 
is magical thinking at best� It would be 
far better to rethink the policies that 
caused the mess in the first place�
To be clear, Porch is not arguing that 
CoIN is bound to fail strategically� 
sometimes the context is favorable� 
sometimes the insurgents have no allies 
or sanctuaries� sometimes their cause 
has no popular appeal� sometimes their 
leaders are inept or so brutal that they 
drive the people away from them� some-
times the incumbents are competent, 
willing to adapt politically and militarily 
to meet the challenge� More often than 
Porch admits, counterinsurgents do win, 
but not because CoIN is a form of war-
fare only special operators can under-
stand� “War is war!” says Porch� a strate-
gy appropriate to the context is the most 
important element in victory for both 
the insurgent and the counterinsurgent� 
These concessions on Porch’s part invite 
readers to take some critical distance 
from him� When counterinsurgencies 
go south, maybe the problem is less with 
CoIN as such than with failure to assess 
the strategic environment and adapt 
CoIN doctrine to it� some might object 
that this book is written in an angry 
spirit, highly polemical, and deeply 
one-sided� They might say that Porch 
has written two books, not one� The first 
is an intellectual history of CoIN, in 
which the pattern of making the same 
mistakes occurs again and again; the 
second is a critique of special operations 
in general, one that seems unnecessary 
to Porch’s argument and sometimes 
distracts from it� Plenty of insurgencies 
occur without the presence of foreign 
occupiers, so one cannot blame them or 
the problems of counterinsurgency on 
imperialism or paternalism alone� Porch 
is right that general Petraeus was lucky 
that the surge in Iraq coincided with the 
so-called sunni awakening against al 
Qaeda and with other developments  
in Iraq, but strategic wisdom often in-
volves taking advantage of good luck� If  
Petraeus’s relative success in Iraq did not 
result directly from his personal role in 
redrafting american CoIN doctrine and 
applying it intelligently to Iraq, it was 
nonetheless a vast improvement over 
the work of his predecessors, who did 
not plan for a potential insurgency and 
were slow to confront it—even occa-
sionally aggravated it� arguably the war 
in Iraq, a war of choice, was a strategic 
mistake, with american service mem-
bers stuck cleaning up the mess until the 
U�s� government could find a dignified 
way to leave� Yet no less arguably, there 
was no alternative to intervening in 
afghanistan, about which Porch says 
very little, because to fight al Qaeda, 
which was sheltered by the Taliban, the 
United states in 2001 found it necessary 
to overthrow the government, though 
with a high probability that it would 
have to deal with an insurgency from 
the Taliban while fighting the terrorists� 
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Porch suggests no alternative approach 
for afghanistan, so his critique has 
limited usefulness for evaluating U�s� 
strategy in that conflict� afghanistan, 
indeed, is a very tough case for Porch’s 
critique� It invites readers to ask whether 
problems there resulted from trying too 
much or too little CoIN, while domestic 
support in the United states for the war 
was high before getting distracted with 
Iraq� or perhaps the strategic context 
was so challenging that nothing better 
than a weak government in Kabul could 
have been expected—implying, perhaps,  
that after scattering al Qaeda in 2001, 
the best realistic option would have 
been to withdraw quickly and turn the 
struggle over to whatever government 
the afghans managed to establish, even 
if it did not meet many Western stan-
dards of good government� or maybe 
the problem was that CoIN doctrine 
can lead to unrealistic expectations that 
provoke precisely the kind of critique 
Porch has written� Had Porch focused 
more on what is necessary to make 
such expectations more sober—how he 
might have rewritten army FM 3-24, 
for example—his book would have been 
improved substantially� Instead, those 
who rewrite that manual will have to 
take both Porch’s book and more than 
a grain of salt into account in devel-
oping an approach to CoIN that is 
genuinely sober in its expectations� 
Karl WallINg
Naval War College Monterey Program
shi Xiaoqin� Seapower and Sino-U.S. Relations� 
Beijing: Military science, 2013� 320pp� Ұ42
Seapower and Sino-U.S. Relations is a 
comparative study of the quest for sea 
power by nations that are considered 
“maritime power states” and “continen-
tal power states” and it is an attempt to 
apply related lessons to an understand-
ing of current sino-U�s� relations� 
according to the author, traditionally 
maritime powers, such as the United 
states and the United Kingdom, have 
generally adopted a more offensive pos-
ture in their quest for sea power, mainly 
in terms of gaining “command of the 
sea” or in influencing development on 
the continent, as reflected in the works 
of american and British sea-power 
theorists alfred Mahan and sir Julian 
Corbett� The key to understanding 
Mahan, the author holds, is his empha-
sis on the aim of acquiring “absolute 
command of the sea” through decisive 
fleet engagement, which requires force 
concentration and capital ships capable 
of superior firepower� This central aim 
relegates other aims, such as sea-lane 
protection, commerce raiding, and naval 
blockade, and the building of capabilities 
requisite for them, to lesser priorities� 
Mahan, however, is critically questioned 
by Corbett, shi Xiaoqin points out� 
Corbett, for instance, believes “absolute 
command of the sea” is neither pos-
sible nor necessary, because most of 
the seas, most of the time, are open and 
contested and accessible for productive 
use and exploitation� as a result, flotilla 
operations to protect sea-lanes may be 
important, but building capital ships for 
“decisive fleet engagement” may divert 
resources away from them� also, the 
more the strong side wants a decisive 
battle through force concentration, 
the more incentive the weak side has 
to avoid such an engagement, through 
force dispersion to reduce losses� For 
Corbett, according to the author, sea 
control should also serve more useful 
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